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Gib van Ert*

POGG and Treaties: The Role of International
Agreements in National Concern Analysis

Canada’s international treaty obligations have featured prominently in Privy Council and
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on Parliament’s power to make laws for the
peace, order and good government of Canada (POGG). How treaties ought properly
to be used in determining Parliament’s POGG jurisdiction is a constitutionally fraught
question. The federal executive cannot be permitted to extend Parliament’s legislative
jurisdiction by making promises to foreign states. Yet the existence of treaty obligations
is undoubtedly relevant to the question of whether a given subject has become a matter
of national concern. In the upcoming Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act references,
the Supreme Court of Canada will confront this problem again. This article seeks to
explain how courts may properly use international agreements in POGG cases.
Les obligations du Canada en vertu des traités internationaux ont occupé une place
importante dans la jurisprudence du Conseil privé et de la Cour suprême du Canada
concernant le pouvoir du Parlement d’adopter des lois pour la paix, l’ordre et le bon
gouvernement du Canada. La question de savoir comment les traités doivent être
utilisés pour déterminer la compétence du Parlement en ces matières est une question
d’ordre constitutionnel. L’exécutif fédéral ne peut être autorisé à étendre la compétence
législative du Parlement en faisant des promesses à des États étrangers. Pourtant,
l’existence d’obligations conventionnelles est sans aucun doute pertinente pour
déterminer si un sujet donné est devenu un sujet d’intérêt national. La Cour suprême
du Canada sera à nouveau confrontée à ce problème lors des prochains renvois relatifs
à la Loi sur la tarification de la pollution causée par les gaz à effet de serre. Le présent
article cherche à expliquer comment les tribunaux peuvent utiliser correctement les
accords internationaux dans les affaires relatives aux lois pour la paix, l’ordre et le bon
gouvernement.
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Introduction
Three references arising from Parliament’s Greenhouse Gas Pollution
Pricing Act will soon be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada. In each
case, Canada is defending the legislation as valid under the national
concern branch of Parliament’s peace, order and good government (POGG)
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power. And in each case Canada is invoking the state’s obligations under
international climate change agreements. International agreements have
played a central, if somewhat uncertain, role in POGG cases going back
to the days of the Privy Council. How treaties ought properly to be used in
determining Parliament’s POGG jurisdiction is a constitutionally fraught
question. I explain the issue, and attempt to distill some conclusions from
the case law, here.
The constitutional problem is this: how can courts reconcile the
undoubted relevance of Canada’s international treaty obligations to the
national concern analysis with the clear risk to federalism posed by an
expanded federal legislative reach justified by unilateral federal treatymaking?
I. The three references
The governments of Saskatchewan, Ontario and Alberta have each
challenged the federal Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act1 as ultra
vires Parliament in references to their respective courts of appeal. All three
courts sat in five-judge divisions to consider the issue, and all three courts
split. In Saskatchewan the Act was upheld three to two.2 In Ontario the
result was four to one in favour.3 The only court to strike down the Act was
Alberta, four to one.4
In each proceeding, Canada conceded that the Act could not be
supported under an enumerated head of federal power. Instead, Canada
resorted to POGG. More specifically, Canada’s case rested on POGG’s
national concern branch. According to this doctrine, Parliament may enact
laws concerning both new matters that did not exist at Confederation
(when the distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the
provincial legislatures was enacted in the Constitution Act, 1867) and
matters that, although originally of a local or private nature in a province,
have become matters of national concern.
Canada’s argument, and the judgments of the three courts of appeal,
rely extensively on the international legal regime governing climate
change. The main instruments referred to are treaties to which Canada
is—or, in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, once was—a party. They are
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992
(UNFCCC),5 the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

SC 2018, c 12.
Reference re: Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 SKCA 40 [Saskatchewan Reference].
Reference re: Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 544 [Ontario Reference].
Reference re: Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020 ABCA 74 [Alberta Reference].
1994, Can TS No 7.
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Convention on Climate Change 1997,6 and the Paris Agreement 2015.7
Also relied on is a non-binding international instrument, the Copenhagen
Accord.8
Before looking more closely at the three references, we need to
situate them in the case law. Courts and governments have been turning
to international agreements in POGG cases since the 1930s. Whether and
how the state’s treaty obligations affect Parliament’s legislative jurisdiction
has been controversial. A review of the cases shows why.
II. Privy Council case law on treaties and POGG
1. Re Aeronautics
In Re Aeronautics, the question was Parliament’s competence to legislate
in the field of aeronautics.9 The Supreme Court of Canada had gone against
the Dominion, holding that while Parliament had considerable section
91 jurisdiction in the area, the provinces also had jurisdiction for some
aspects. The Privy Council rejected this approach, conferring aeronautics
as a whole on Parliament chiefly—but not wholly—on the basis of the
Empire treaties provision (section 132) of the Constitution Act, 1867:
The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers
necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of
any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign
Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign
Countries.10

Largely forgotten today, this provision clearly granted Parliament
legislative jurisdiction to perform British Empire treaty obligations, i.e.,
to implement them in domestic law. The treaty relied upon in this case
was the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation 1919,11 an
agreement ratified by His Majesty on behalf of the British Empire in 1922.
Lord Chancellor Sankey for the Board found that Parliament’s
aeronautics legislation was, for the most part, in performance of Canada’s
obligations under the Convention and therefore intra vires Parliament
under section 132. Yet Parliament’s enactment included military aircraft,
6.
1998, 37 ILM 32, 2303 UNTS 1 (entered into force on 16 February 2005, Canada withdrew
effective 15 December 2012).
7.
2016, Can TS No 9 [Paris Agreement].
8.
UNFCCC, 15th Sess, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (18 December 2009).
9.
Reference re: Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] 1 DLR 58 (PC), [1932]
3 WWR 625 [Re Aeronautics].
10. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 20 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 132, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II. No
5 [Constitution Act, 1867].
11. 1919, UKTS 002, Cmd 1609 (entered into force on 29 March 1922).
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a matter not under the Convention at all. That jurisdiction might readily
have been found under section 91(7) (“Militia, Military and Naval Service,
and Defence”), but the Board did not rely on that head of power. Rather, it
invoked Parliament’s POGG power as set out in Re Fisheries Act, 191412
and earlier Privy Council authorities, saying:
There may be a small portion of the field which is not by virtue of
specific words in the B.N.A. Act vested in the Dominion ; but neither
is it vested by specific words in the Provinces. As to such small portion
it appears to the Board that it must necessarily belong to the Dominion
under its power to make laws for the peace, order and good government
of Canada. Further their Lordships are influenced by the facts that the
subject of aerial navigation and the fulfilment of Canadian obligations
under s. 132 are matters of national interest and importance; and that
aerial navigation is a class of subject which has attained such dimensions
as to affect the body politic of the Dominion.13

This is far from a clear explanation of the relevance of treaty obligations
to the national concern branch of POGG. But the suggestion is that the fact
that Canada has international obligations to perform in domestic law may
support the validity of an Act of Parliament the subject matter of which
does not fall within an enumerated head of either federal or provincial
power. The existence of a treaty, it seems, may be indicative that the matter
of the legislation under scrutiny is of national concern under Parliament’s
residual power.
2. Re Radio
The issue came back before the Privy Council almost immediately,
this time with a Canadian rather than an Empire treaty. In Re Radio,
the question was legislative jurisdiction over the regulation and control
of radio communication.14 The treaty in issue was the International
Radiotelegraph Convention 1927,15 an agreement negotiated, signed and
ratified by Canada independent from the UK. The Convention not being
an Empire treaty, section 132 did not apply. Yet Viscount Dunedin for the
Board concluded that “it comes to the same thing” because, being “quite
unthought-of in 1867” and “not mentioned explicitly in either s. 91 or s.
92,” legislation to give domestic effect to a Canadian treaty obligation
falls within POGG.16 The learned judge explained:
12. [1930] WWR 449, [1930] 1 DLR 194 (PC).
13. Re Aeronautics, supra note 9 at 70.
14. Reference re: Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada, [1932] 2 DLR 81
(PC), [1932] 1 WWR 563 [Re Radio].
15. 1929, Can TS No 1.
16. Re Radio, supra note 14 at 83-84.
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It is Canada as a whole which is amenable to the other powers for the
proper carrying out of the Convention : and to prevent individuals in
Canada infringing the stipulations of the Convention it is necessary
that the Dominion should pass legislation which should apply to all the
dwellers in Canada.17

This was not the Board’s sole rationale for conferring radio on Parliament.
It also relied on section 92(10)(a)’s exception to provincial jurisdiction
for telegraphs and other works and undertakings connecting the provinces
or extending beyond provincial limits. Nevertheless, the treaty is clearly
doing significant work here in expanding Parliament’s jurisdiction.
Bringing aeronautics and radio within Parliament’s power as matters
of national concern was undoubtedly convenient. But Parliament’s
POGG jurisdiction was granted before the attainment of full Canadian
statehood, and appears not to have contemplated a federal (as opposed to
imperial) treaty-making power. The result in Re Radio seemed to allow the
Government of Canada to expand Parliament’s legislative competence, and
correspondingly reduce that of the provincial legislatures, by concluding
legal agreements with foreign states. In a striking course correction, the
Privy Council adopted a very different approach in Attorney-General
for Canada v Attorney-General for Ontario (better known as the Labour
Conventions case).18
3. Re Labour Conventions
Like Re Aeronautics and Re Radio, Re Labour Conventions was a reference
to determine the validity of federal legislation. In a sweeping invasion of
what was admittedly provincial jurisdiction, Parliament enacted a series
of laws aimed at pulling Canada’s economy out of the Great Depression
with a Roosevelt-style New Deal. Canada admitted the legislation was
within the provinces’ legislative jurisdiction under section 92(13) unless
some federal head of power could be made out. That was to be found,
Canada contended, in the labour part of the Treaty of Versailles 1919,19
which contemplated subsequent treaties for the improvement of labour
conditions worldwide. To this end, conventions were adopted through
the International Labour Organization in 1919, 1921 and 1928. They
limited industrial work hours, established weekly rest, and provided for
minimum wages.20 Canada belatedly ratified the three conventions in
17. Ibid at 84.
18. [1937] AC 326, [1937] 1 WWR 299 [Labour Conventions].
19. 1919, Can TS No 4.
20. See The Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, SC 1935, c 14; The Minimum Wages Act,
SC 1935, c 44; The Limitation of Hours of Work Act, SC 1935, c 63.
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quick succession in March and April 1935. Parliament then enacted the
impugned laws in implementation of the three conventions, using the new
powers Re Radio had seemed to grant.
Labour Conventions is best known today for Lord Atkin’s momentous
conclusion that:
For the purposes of ss. 91 and 92, i.e., the distribution of legislative
powers between the Dominion and the Provinces, there is no such thing
as treaty legislation as such. The distribution is based on classes of
subjects; and as a treaty deals with a particular class of subjects so will
the legislative power of performing it be ascertained.21

In other words, Parliament cannot necessarily implement treaties made
by the Federal Government. Whether it can do so or not is determined
according to the ordinary division of powers. This was effectively the
conclusion Justice Duff for the Supreme Court of Canada had reached
in 1925 in a reference concerning one of the same three treaties at issue
in Labour Conventions.22 Yet Lord Atkin’s decision came as a stunning
surprise because Re Radio had seemed to establish the opposite rule,
i.e., that treaty legislation was a matter of national concern falling within
Parliament’s residual POGG power. Lord Atkin rejected that conclusion,
observing that the legislation now before the Board could not be brought
within section 91, and was in fact “expressly excluded from the general
powers given by the first words of the section.”23 He is referring here to
the limitation on Parliament’s POGG jurisdiction to “Matters not coming
within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the
Legislatures of the Provinces.”24
As for Re Radio, Lord Atkin distinguished it from Re Labour
Conventions based on the subject matters of the treaties at issue in the
two cases. The radiotelegraph convention dealt with classes of matters not
falling within either section 91 or 92. The labour conventions, meanwhile,
each came within section 92. By this reasoning, Lord Atkin left open
the possibility that Canadian treaty obligations might support a claim to
POGG jurisdiction in cases where the treaty’s subject matter does not fall
within section 92, while largely closing the loophole Re Radio introduced
that permitted federal governments to expand Parliament’s jurisdiction at
the expense of the provinces by “making promises to foreign countries.”25
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Labour Conventions, supra note 18 at 351.
Re Legislative Jurisdiction over Hours of Labour, [1925] SCR 505, [1925] 3 DLR 1114.
Labour Conventions, supra note 18 at 350.
Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 10, s 91.
Labour Conventions, supra note 18 at 352.
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Elsewhere I have told the story of how infuriated English Canadian
commentators were by Re Labour Conventions.26 The decision was an
important nail in the coffin then under construction for the Privy Council’s
appellate jurisdiction over Canada. But the Supreme Court of Canada has
nevertheless maintained (with some wobbles, as we will see) the rule that
the implementation of treaty obligations in domestic law is determined
according to the distribution of powers provided for by the Constitution
Act 1867.
III. Supreme Court of Canada case law on treaties and national concern
1. Johannesson
The question of treaties and POGG in the field of aeronautics came back
before the courts—this time with the Supreme Court of Canada serving
as the final court of appeal—in Johannesson v Municipality of West St.
Paul.27 Mr. Johannesson had been operating a civil aviation business since
the late 1920s. He acquired land outside Winnipeg for an airport. The
local municipality objected to the noise and adopted bylaws effectively
prohibiting his intended use of the land. All seven judges of the Supreme
Court of Canada found the bylaws, and their authorizing provincial statute,
ultra vires because aeronautics was within the exclusive jurisdiction
of Parliament. Despite there being five sets of reasons, the underlying
reasoning in each is largely consistent on the key point, namely that
aeronautics was a matter of national concern under POGG and that the
presence of relevant treaty obligations supported that conclusion.
A notable aspect of Johannesson was that the underlying treaty
was no longer an Empire treaty. Recall that in Re Aeronautics, the
Privy Council relied chiefly on Parliament’s jurisdiction under section
132, and additionally on Parliament’s residual jurisdiction in respect
of matters not assigned to the provinces and that had become matters
of national concern. While Lord Atkin described this latter part of the
reasoning in Re Aeronautics as obiter, the wisdom of it became clear in
Johannesson. To leave an Empire treaty as the sole juridical foundation
for federal jurisdiction less than a year after the enactment of the Statute
of Westminster28 risked a disruptive loss of that jurisdiction in the event
that Canada ever withdrew from the treaty. As indeed it did. By means
of an executive certificate from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign

26. Gib van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at
259-263.
27. [1952] 1 SCR 292, [1951] 4 DLR 609 [Johannesson].
28. 1931 c 4.
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Affairs, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada informed the Supreme
Court that Canada had denounced the Convention of 1919 in the course of
ratifying the new Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation29 in
1947. The latter treaty was, of course, made by Canada independent from
the British Empire, and therefore section 132 did not apply. As Justice
Kerwin observed, that provision “therefore ceased to have any efficacy to
permit Parliament to legislate upon the subject of aeronautics.”30
Johannesson is, in a sense, the first modern consideration of the place
of international agreements in POGG analysis—shorn of the potentially
clouding influence of section 132 and finally decided by the Supreme Court
of Canada. What role did the court assign to the Chicago Convention in
its POGG analysis? Perhaps the clearest statement is from Justice Kerwin:
Now, even at the date of the Aeronautics case, the Judicial Committee
was influenced (i.e. in the determination of the main point) by the fact
that in their opinion the subject of air navigation was a matter of national
interest and importance and had attained such dimensions. That that is
so at the present time is shown by the terms of the Chicago Convention
of 1944 and the provisions of the Dominion Aeronautics Act and the
regulations thereunder referred to above. The affidavit of the appellant
Johannesson, from which the statement of facts was culled, also shows
the importance that the subject of air navigation has attained in Canada.
To all of which may be added those matters of everyday knowledge of
which the Court must be taken to be aware.31

In this passage, the learned judge assimilates the Chicago Convention
with the federal Aeronautics Act and its regulations, the affidavit of
Mr. Johannesson, and notorious facts (“those matters of everyday
knowledge of which the Court must be taken to be aware”), all of which
show aeronautics to be a matter of national concern. In short, the treaty
(including, one presumes, the fact of its existence and its content) is
evidence in favour of the legal conclusion that the matter of aeronautics is
within POGG as a matter of national concern. It is somewhat odd to treat
a legal instrument—the Chicago Convention—as evidence. It is perhaps
odder still to treat the Aeronautics Act and its regulations as such. Clearly
that is not how courts approach statutes, regulations and international
instruments for most purposes. But it makes sense for POGG purposes.
The court must determine whether the subject matter of a contested
enactment goes beyond local or provincial concern or interests to attain

29.
30.
31.

7 December 1944, UNTS No 102.
Johannesson, supra note 27 at 307.
Ibid at 308.
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national dimensions. For the purpose of that inquiry, the existence and
content of a treaty obligation may be relevant in an evidentiary way.
2. Anti-Inflation and Vapor Canada
The next Supreme Court decision squarely concerning POGG and
treaties was The Queen v Hauser.32 Two POGG cases were decided in
between, however: Munro v National Capital Commission33 and Re AntiInflation Act.34 Neither of those involved an international agreement. But
the plurality in Re Anti-Inflation did have cause to refer to international
treaty-making and its internal consequences. The legislative scheme under
consideration involved an Act of Parliament (the Anti-Inflation Act)35 and
an agreement between the governments of Canada and Ontario concerning
the application of the Act (and regulatory guidelines made thereunder)
to the Ontario public sector. Chief Justice Laskin (for himself and three
others) upheld the Act under POGG’s emergency doctrine but found that
the Canada-Ontario agreement did not render the Act and guidelines
applicable to the provincial public sector. The chief justice explained that
there is “no principle in this country, as there is not in Great Britain, that the
Crown may legislate by proclamation or order in council to bind citizens
where it so acts without the support of a statute of the Legislature” and
that “even if the agreement is binding upon the Government of Ontario
as such, on the analogy of treaties which may bind the contracting parties
but yet be without domestic force, that would not make the agreement part
of the law of Ontario binding upon persons purportedly affected by it.”36
In short, intergovernmental agreements, like international agreements,
require legislative implementation to take effect in domestic law.37
32. [1979] 1 SCR 984, 46 CCC (2d) 481 [Hauser].
33. [1966] SCR 663, 57 DLR (2d) 753.
34. [1976] 2 SCR 373, 68 DLR (3d) 452 [Re Anti-Inflation].
35. SC 1974–1976, c 75.
36. Re Anti-Inflation, supra note 32 at 433.
37. This principle is qualified, in respect of international agreements, by the interpretive presumption
of conformity with international law. While treaties cannot take direct legal effect without legislative
implementation, courts have recognized that the presumption of conformity confers indirect legal effect
on treaties whether implemented or not. See: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v PT
Garuda Indonesia (No 9), [2013] FCA 323 (Fed Ct Australia) at para 43: “when…a court construes a
statute to comply with a treaty obligation…international law then exerts a discernible influence on the
content of local law”; R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2016] EWHC
2768 (Admin) at para 33: “treaties can have certain indirect interpretive effects in relation to domestic
law”; Higgs v Minister of National Security and Others (Bahamas), [1999] UKPC 55 at para 12:
treaties have “no effect upon the rights and duties of citizens in common or statute law” but “may have
an indirect effect upon the construction of statutes”; Bhajan v Bhajan, 2010 ONCA 714 at para 14:
“Although the Convention has not been specifically incorporated into domestic law and its provisions
therefore have no direct application in Canadian law, the values reflected in the Convention can help
to inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review.”
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One other case needs mention before coming to Hauser. In MacDonald
v Vapor Canada Ltd,38 the Supreme Court of Canada flirted with the notion
of overruling the central holding of Labour Conventions, namely that there
is no power in Parliament to implement Canadian treaty obligations where
the subject matter of the treaty would otherwise come within provincial
legislative jurisdiction. This was in response to the appellants’ contention
(supported by the Attorney General of Canada) that the provision under
scrutiny could be supported under POGG. In an extensive obiter dictum,
Chief Justice Laskin quoted approvingly from Lord Dunedin in Re Radio,
including the observation that treaty-implementing legislation, being not
contemplated in 1867 and not explicitly mentioned in either section 91 or
92, falls within POGG. Having walked right to the edge of this precipice,
Chief Justice Laskin declined to jump. He concluded that Parliament had
not expressly stated that the provision at issue was in implementation of a
treaty, and that:
assuming Parliament has power to pass legislation implementing a treaty
or convention in relation to matters covered by the treaty or convention
which would otherwise be for provincial legislation alone, the exercise
of that power must be manifested in the implementing legislation and not
be left to inference.39

In concurring reasons, Justice de Grandpré observed that he was initially
attracted to the submission that the court was faced with “legislation
enacted by Parliament under the Treaty making power of Canada,” but
he concluded that the treaty had no application here.40 Thus all judges
of the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed, if only in obiter, the notion
that Parliament might have a power under POGG to implement treaty
obligations incurred by the federal government.
The constitutional implications of what was contemplated here are
enormous. To reverse Labour Conventions and bestow upon the federal
government a unilateral power to expand Parliament’s jurisdiction through
international treaty-making would radically reshape the Canadian division
of powers. Parliament’s powers would increase dramatically, and the
provinces’ powers would diminish to the same extent.
It seems clear that the Vapor court lacked a proper appreciation of how
many treaties Canada concludes each year, how many of those involve
domestic legal issues, and how many of those domestic legal issues touch
provincial jurisdiction. In 1977 there was no easy way of knowing these
38.
39.
40.

[1977] 2 SCR 134, 66 DLR (3d) 1.
Ibid at 171.
Ibid at 176.
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things. Incredibly, the same is true in 2020. Canada’s practices in the
conclusion and domestic performance of treaties remain scandalously
opaque. There is no easy way to discover what treaties are in contemplation,
what treaties are concluded, what existing federal and provincial laws are
relied upon to perform them, or even, in many cases, what new laws are
adopted in implementation of them. Even when answers to some of these
questions are in the public record, it is in such an obscure and inaccessible
way as to not constitute publication at all.41 The result of this sorry state
of affairs is that courts and litigants frequently go about their business in
ignorance of the international aspects and implications of their work.
3. Hauser
Much of the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in The Queen v Hauser
concerned jurisdiction over the preference of indictments and conduct of
proceedings under the Narcotic Control Act.42 But the Court also had to
characterize that Act for division of powers purposes. The majority held
that the Act was not made in exercise of Parliament’s criminal law power,
for its character was the control, rather than prohibition, of narcotics.
Instead, Parliament’s jurisdiction was found in POGG’s national concern
branch. The control of narcotics was, according to the majority, a genuinely
new problem that did not exist at the time of Confederation and could not
be classified as a matter of a merely local or private nature.43
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Pigeon for the majority relied
significantly on Canadian treaty obligations.44 He reviewed the history
of federal legislation on narcotics, noting contemporaneous international
agreements on the subject, starting with a 1912 Empire treaty45 and
continuing with Canadian treaties of 1925,46 193147 and 1961.48 In support
of his view that the impugned Act’s character was for the control and not
41. For instance, since 2008 the federal government’s Policy on Tabling of Treaties in Parliament has
required the Minister of Foreign Affairs to table treaties in the House of Commons accompanied by an
explanatory memorandum covering such key issues as the treaty’s main obligations, its implications
for the provinces and territories, and its implementation in domestic law. This information would be
extremely valuable for courts and litigants. Yet these explanatory memoranda are not published on
Global Affairs Canada’s web site, nor on Parliament’s web site, nor (to my knowledge) anywhere else.
42. Hauser, supra note 30.
43. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 10, s 92(16).
44. Hauser, supra note 30 at 998-999.
45. International Opium Convention, 1912, [1921] UKTS No 17. This treaty is not expressly cited
by Justice Pigeon, but his reference to a 1912 international convention for the suppression of opium
and other drugs must surely be a reference to it (Hauser, supra note 30 at 998).
46. International Convention relating to Dangerous Drugs, 1925 [1928] Can TS No 4.
47. International Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotics Drugs, 1931 [1932] Can TS No 7.
48. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 [1964] Can TS No 30.
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the prohibition of narcotics, Justice Pigeon quoted from the preamble
of the 1961 treaty, pointing to the medical use of narcotic drugs and the
need for measures to prevent their abuse.49 Like radio and aeronautics,
the subject-matter of narcotics control was (he held) a new development
since Confederation that fell within Parliament’s residual power. While
Justice Pigeon does not expressly say that the treaties themselves have
not expanded Parliament’s jurisdiction, his reasoning is entirely consistent
with that conclusion. Like Justice Kerwin in Johannesson, Justice Pigeon
seems to regard the treaty obligations as evidence of the advent of a matter
that is new (in the sense of postdating Confederation) and national or
international in dimension (rather than merely local or private).
Mr. Justice Dickson (as he then was) dissented, approving Justice
Beetz’s approach to POGG in Re Anti-Inflation whereby the national
concern doctrine would be restricted to new matters not falling within
section 92 and being by their nature of national concern. He would have
characterized the Narcotic Control Act as falling within Parliament’s
criminal law power, as would have Justice Spence. Nearly 25 years later,
in R v Malmo-Levine, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed,
holding that the Narcotic Control Act was a valid exercise of Parliament’s
criminal law power and expressly disagreed with Justice Pigeon’s view
that the Act came within Parliament’s POGG power in respect of new
matters.50 The majority left open, however, the possibility that the Act might
be justifiable under POGG’s national concern branch. Justice Pigeon’s use
of treaties in the course of POGG analysis was not considered.
4. Schneider
Narcotics and POGG came before the Supreme Court of Canada again
in Schneider v The Queen.51 The question was the constitutionality of
British Columbia’s Heroin Treatment Act.52 The trial judge, Chief Justice
McEachern, understandably concluded from Hauser that Parliament
had exclusive jurisdiction over narcotics. The Court of Appeal reversed,
finding BC’s law to be a matter of health care and not in conflict with the
federal enactment.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. The majority
reasons were by Justice Dickson, the same judge who dissented from
Hauser’s conclusion that the Narcotic Control Act was valid federal law
under POGG. The learned judge acknowledged he was bound by Hauser
49.
50.
51.
52.

Hauser, supra note 30 at para 43.
2003 SCC 74 at paras 70-72.
[1982] 2 SCR 112, 139 DLR (3d) 417 [Schneider].
RSBC 1979, c 166.

914 The Dalhousie Law Journal

but found that BC’s law was not in relation to the control of narcotic
drugs (which Hauser had made a matter of federal POGG jurisdiction)
but “deals, rather, with the consequences of narcotic use from a provincial
aspect.”53 He characterized heroin addiction as a largely local or provincial
problem (“it was not disputed that, historically, between 60 and 70 per
cent of all known heroin addicts in Canada have resided in the Province
of British Columbia”54) and not one that has become a matter of national
concern so as to come within POGG.
The appellant ran the Vapor Canada argument, contending that
Parliament has jurisdiction to enact laws in relation to Canadian treaty
obligations, and that even if federal implementation of treaties “touches
upon a provincial subject matter, it is competent for Parliament to
do so in relation to a treaty as a matter of national concern.”55 Justice
Dickson described the point as “left open” in Vapor, while noting it was
“questionable” in the face of Re Labour Conventions. He then added that
the Court in Vapor had “held that even assuming Parliament has power to
pass legislation implementing a treaty…the exercise of the power must be
manifested in the implementing legislation and not be left to inference,”56
and that nothing in the Narcotic Control Act indicates it was enacted in
implementation of Canada’s treaty obligations. This reasoning is suspect
in two ways. First, I question the term “held” here; Chief Justice Laskin’s
comments in Vapor were obiter of the highest order, and expressly not a
holding. Second, it is wilful blindness to pretend that the Narcotic Control
Act was not enacted in at least partial implementation of Canadian treaty
obligations.
In a trenchant case note to Schneider, Professor de Mestral concluded:
With the obiter dicta in Vapor Canada and Schneider concerning the
treaty-implementing power, the Supreme Court of Canada has taken
itself very far out on a limb. If the court is not careful the branch will
soon break and the court and the country will be the worse for it. There
is still time to climb down.57

One cannot point to an express climb-down in any decision of the Court
since de Mestral’s plea. But his plea does seem to have been heeded, for the
supposed general power of Parliament to implement treaties under POGG

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Schneider, supra note 49 at 130.
Ibid at 131.
Ibid at 135.
Ibid.
Armand de Mestral et al, “Note of Cases” (1983) 61:4 Canadian Bar Review 856 at 865.
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has not returned, and indeed was pointedly neglected by the Supreme
Court of Canada in its next major POGG pronouncement.
5. Crown Zellerbach
The leading POGG case today is R v Crown Zellerbach, in which Justice
Le Dain for a bare (four to three) majority of the court synthesized the
authorities into something like a test for whether an impugned provision
can be supported under Parliament’s residual power.58 Once again, an
international agreement was at the heart of the case.
Section 4(1) of the federal Ocean Dumping Control Act prohibited
the dumping of any substance at sea except according to the terms and
conditions of a permit.59 The sea was defined as including internal waters
of Canada other than fresh waters. Thus the Act prohibited dumping in
provincial marine waters. The respondent logging company, charged with
unlawful dumping, got the charges dismissed on the ground that section
4(1) was ultra vires Parliament. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia
agreed.
Mr. Justice Le Dain’s analysis begins with the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter
1972.60 His very first observation on the treaty signals a departure from
Vapor Canada and Schneider. In place of those cases’ strict requirement
that Parliament expressly state that its Act implements a treaty, Justice Le
Dain observes: “[t]he Act would appear to have been enacted in fulfillment
of Canada’s obligations under the Convention…That is not expressly stated
in the Act, but” there are several textual and legislative-historical reasons
to draw that conclusion.61 This is a superior approach for the simple reason
that it accords with how Parliament actually performs treaty obligations
in domestic law. While Parliament sometimes expressly enacts laws to
implement treaties, it frequently also enacts new laws, or amends existing
laws, for that same purpose without expressly saying so.62
Justice Le Dain continues to distance himself from Vapor Canada and
Schneider in the rest of his reasons. This is no doubt due in part to the
position taken by the Attorney General of Canada. At trial and on appeal,
the Crown had argued unsuccessfully that section 4(1) was enacted under
the treaty-making power hypothesized in Vapor Canada. But on further

58. [1988] 1 SCR 401, 49 DLR (4th) 161 [Crown Zellerbach].
59. SC 1974–1976, c 55.
60. 1979, Can TS No 36.
61. Crown Zellerbach, supra note 56 at 408.
62. See the discussion and examples in Phillip Saunders & Robert Currie, Kindred’s International
Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 9th ed (Toronto: Emond, 2019) at 212-216.
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appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Crown’s position changed.
The Attorney General now explicitly declined to rely on a POGG treaty
power. Instead:
His contention was that the control of dumping in provincial marine
waters was an integral part of a single matter of national concern…He
referred to the Convention and its Annexes as indicating the mischief to
which the Act is directed and as supporting his characterization of the
matter in relation to which the Act was enacted.63

This is a return to the use of treaties in POGG cases employed by Justice
Kerwin in Johannesson and Justice Pigeon in Hauser, both of which are
consistent with Lord Atkin’s dictum in Labour Conventions that “the
Dominion cannot merely by making promises to foreign countries clothe
itself with legislative authority inconsistent with the constitution which
gave it birth.”64 The existence of a treaty obligation is not itself a juridical
basis for Parliament’s legislative jurisdiction. But the treaty’s terms may
support Parliament’s claim to jurisdiction under POGG.
Justice Le Dain’s definitive departure from Vapor Canada (and
Schneider to the extent that it approved the former) is revealed in his
account of POGG jurisprudence. His reasons contain an extensive review
of the Canadian cases, starting with Johannesson and including Munro,
Re Anti-Inflation, Hauser and others. Vapor Canada is left out entirely.
Schneider is not omitted, but that part of it concerning the treaty power
hypothesized in Vapor Canada is. “From this survey,” explains Justice Le
Dain, four conclusions about the national concern doctrine can be drawn:

63.
64.

1.

The national concern doctrine is separate and distinct from
the national emergency doctrine of the peace, order and good
government power, which is chiefly distinguishable by the fact that
it provides a constitutional basis for what is necessarily legislation
of a temporary nature;

2.

The national concern doctrine applies to both new matters which did
not exist at Confederation and to matters which, although originally
matters of a local or private nature in a province, have since, in the
absence of national emergency, become matters of national concern;

3.

For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern in either
sense it must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility
that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern
and a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable
with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the
Constitution;

Crown Zellerbach, supra note 56 at 419.
Labour Conventions, supra note 18 at 352.
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In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree
of singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly
distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern it is relevant to
consider what would be the effect on extra‑provincial interests of a
provincial failure to deal effectively with the control or regulation of
the intra-provincial aspects of the matter.65

Completely missing from this account of POGG is Chief Justice Laskin’s
notion, in Vapor Canada, that Parliament may have power under POGG to
pass legislation implementing a treaty in areas which would otherwise fall
within provincial jurisdiction, so long as Parliament signals its use of that
power by express language indicating its implementing purpose.
Justice Le Dain’s return to the Labour Conventions orthodoxy on this
point is further illustrated by his consideration of the Marine Pollution
Convention.66 He begins with the statement, “Marine pollution, because
of its predominantly extra-provincial as well as international character
and implications, is clearly a matter of concern to Canada as a whole.”67
Crucially, it is not the fact that Canada has contracted treaty obligations
about marine pollution that renders it a matter of national concern. Rather,
it is the issue’s cross-boundary and transnational character. That character
is distinct from (though obviously related to) the fact that Canada has
incurred international legal obligations on the topic. Justice Le Dain notes
the Act’s distinction between pollution of salt water and pollution of fresh
water, and asks whether that distinction “is sufficient to make the control
of marine pollution by the dumping of substances a single, indivisible
matter falling within the national concern doctrine.”68 In answering that
question, he notes that the Convention treats pollution by dumping as “a
distinct and separate form of water pollution having its own characteristics
and scientific considerations.”69 He finds reinforcement for this impression
in a UN report that was placed before the Court in argument. Reference
to this report, alongside the Convention, serves to underscore that
international legal obligations are not driving the analysis here, for clearly
Canada has no obligations arising from the report. As in Johanesson and
Hauser, these sources are examined not as legal instruments (though the
treaty undoubtedly is that), but as potentially supporting or refuting the
contention that the Act’s subject matter is one of national concern.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Crown Zellerbach, supra note 56 at 431-432.
Ibid at 436.
Ibid at 435.
Ibid.
Ibid at 436.
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Justice Le Dain notes a key difference between the Act and the
Convention: the latter does not require regulation of dumping in states’
internal marine waters. To the contrary, the Convention expressly excludes
internal waters from its definition of the sea. But this fact does not weaken
Canada’s POGG claim, in Justice Le Dain’s view. The Convention has
limited states’ obligations in this way “presumably for reasons of state
policy,” but the UN report nevertheless emphasizes the “obviously close
relationship…between pollution in coastal waters, including the internal
marine waters of a state, and pollution in the territorial sea.”70 Furthermore,
Justice Le Dain accepts Canada’s contention that the “difficulty of
ascertaining by visual observation the boundary between the territorial sea
and the internal marine waters of a state creates an unacceptable degree
of uncertainty for the application of regulatory and penal provisions”—a
point he says “constitutes the essential indivisibility of the matter of marine
pollution by the dumping of substances.”71 The learned judge concludes
that section 4(1) is valid as legislation falling within the national concern
branch of POGG.
Justice Le Dain’s reasons in Crown Zellerbach are so widely cited
now that we tend to overlook the compelling dissent of Justice La Forest
(Justices Beetz and Lamer concurring). He cannot see any basis under
POGG for section 4(1)’s blanket prohibition against depositing any
substance into provincial waters with no regard to whether it harms the
ocean or not. (“The prohibition in fact would apply to the moving of rock
from one area of provincial property to another.”)72 On the question of
treaties and POGG, however, Justice La Forest says only that the appellant
was right not to take up the Vapor Canada argument here given that the
Convention, unlike the Act, does not address the dumping of waste into
internal water and therefore cannot justify the impugned provision.73
6. Ontario Hydro
The issue in Ontario Hydro v Ontario (Labour Relations Board) was
whether labour relations at Ontario Hydro’s nuclear generating stations
were governed by federal or provincial labour laws.74 Section 18 of the
federal Atomic Energy Control Act75 declared atomic energy works and
undertakings to be for the general advantage of Canada pursuant to section

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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92(10)(c) of the Constitution Act 1867. Canada relied on that provision,
and also on POGG, to assert that the Canada Labour Code applied.
Here again, an international legal regime lurked behind the debate,
though it did not figure as prominently as in the other POGG decisions
considered above. As Chief Justice Lamer observed, “Many of the
security provisions affecting employees in the [Act’s] regulations…,
and the licences under which nuclear facilities operate, can be traced to
Canada’s international obligations in the field of nuclear energy,”76 under
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons77 and the treaties
and agreements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The
chief justice’s reasons made the most extensive references to this legal
regime, focussing more on IAEA reports and articles than on specific
treaty provisions. He concluded from these that, “[o]n the international
level…there is a consistent recognition that supervising employment on
or in connection with facilities for the production of nuclear energy is an
integral part of assuring safety of nuclear facilities and materials.”78
Chief Justice Lamer wrote for himself only. Justice La Forest (Justices
L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier concurring) agreed with his analysis but
added reasons of his own. Justice Iacobucci (Justices Sopinka and Cory
concurring) dissented. He would have held that provincial labour laws
applied. Neither of these sets of reasons considered the international
aspects of the issue.
IV. Treaties and POGG: some conclusions
Having reviewed the case law, we are now able to reach some conclusions
about how courts may properly use international agreements in POGG
analysis.
1. Treaty obligations are relevant to, but not determinative of,
Parliament’s POGG jurisdiction
The decision in Re Labour Conventions was that Parliament does not enjoy
a general power under POGG to implement Canadian treaty obligations
in domestic law. The implementation of treaties in Canada takes place
according to the distribution of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867. But
the POGG power is itself part of that distribution. If an implementing law
can be shown to fall within POGG, Parliament’s jurisdiction is established.
The rule in Re Labour Conventions is not that Parliament can never avail
itself of POGG to implement a treaty. Rather, the rule is that the existence
76.
77.
78.

Ontario Hydro, supra note 72 at 346.
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920 The Dalhousie Law Journal

of the treaty obligation is not, without more, grounds for characterizing
its implementation as a matter of national concern. In other words, in
considering whether an Act of Parliament is a matter of national concern,
the fact that the Act purports to implement a treaty is not determinative of
the question—either in favour of Parliament’s jurisdiction or against it.
Relatedly, we can now conclude that Parliament enjoys no freestanding
treaty implementation power, whether under POGG or otherwise, despite
the passages in Vapor Canada and Schneider suggesting differently.
2. For POGG purposes, treaties are judicially noticeable facts
In POGG cases, unlike the rest of Canadian law, courts look to Canadian
treaty obligations in a largely evidentiary way. Without denying or ignoring
that treaties represent legal obligations the Canadian state is responsible
to perform under international law, courts engaged in POGG analysis look
to treaties as evidence that the impugned Act’s subject matter falls within
Parliament’s residual power. The obligatoriness of the treaty as a matter
of international law is rightly set aside, for the purpose of POGG analysis,
because whether or not Canada can perform the obligation is not the
question; the question is whether Canada can perform the obligation by a
single Act of Parliament, or whether it must instead perform the obligation
by enactments of the ten provinces.
The judicial treatment of international agreements more as factual
than legal considerations in POGG cases is illustrated by the use made
of non-binding international sources in such cases as Crown Zellerbach
and Ontario Hydro. The courts in those cases showed as much interest
in the reports, recommendations and bureaucratic regimes supporting or
relating to the treaties as they did the treaties themselves. In other areas of
Canadian reception law, it would be an error to equate binding and nonbinding instruments like this. Here it is defensible because, as noted, the
question before the court in a POGG case is not “will we conform to or
breach our international obligation?” but “does the Constitution require
performance through the provincial legislatures, or may Parliament act
alone under POGG?”
The judicial approach to treaties in POGG cases is not purely
evidentiary, however. There is no suggestion in any of the cases that a
treaty relied on by the federal government, or considered by the reviewing
court, must be proved in evidence. In POGG cases, as in all other areas,
the Supreme Court of Canada takes judicial notice of the treaty’s existence
and determines its meaning for itself as a question of law. Express Supreme
Court authority for the proposition that it take judicial notice of the state’s
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treaty obligations is regrettably lacking.79 But the Court recently affirmed
that Canadian courts take judicial notice of established rules of customary
international law,80 and it would be strange for the rule to be otherwise
in respect of treaties. More importantly, the entire reception law edifice
described in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, particularly in the last 40
years, rests on courts’ ability to have regard to relevant treaties whether
they are put into evidence by parties or not. One cannot treat international
law as “part of the context in which Canadian laws are enacted”81 without
permitting courts to look to treaties, whether in the record or not.
3. Treaties may demonstrate the advent of a new matter
A treaty may serve to demonstrate the advent of a new matter that did
not exist at Confederation. The decisions in Re Aeronautics, Re Radio
and Hauser all rely on post-Confederation treaties in support of their
conclusion that their subject matters were uncontemplated—and thus
undistributed—at Confederation. What is significant is not the newness
of the treaty itself or the newness of the obligations the treaty imposes
on Canada. It is the newness of the subject matter that both the impugned
legislation and the treaty address.
4. Treaties are relevant to the issue of extra-provincial dimensions
Where the federal government contends that a matter, originally of a local
or private nature in the province, has taken on extra-provincial dimensions
and thus become a matter of national concern, a treaty may support (or, one
assumes, negate) that argument. Re Radio, Re Aeronautics, Johannesson
and Crown Zellerbach are all cases in which treaties were invoked to show
that a matter had attained national dimensions.
5. Treaties are relevant to the singleness/provincial inability analysis
Treaties may tend to support (or seemingly negate) claims that the Act’s
matter possesses the “singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that
clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern.”82 Justice Le
Dain used the Marine Convention in this way in Crown Zellerbach, as did
Chief Justice Lamer in Ontario Hydro. Similar reasoning occurs in Re
Radio, where Viscount Dunedin observed that, “keeping in view the duties
79. But see Turp v Canada (Foreign Affairs), 2018 FCA 133 at paras 82-88, Justice Nadon affirmed
that courts take judicial notice of international law and do not require expert evidence on it; See also
Canadian Planning v Libya, 2015 ONSC 1638 at para 34. In English law, see Trendtex Trading Corp v
Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 QB 529 (Eng CA) at 569. In Australia, see Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission v PT Garuda Indonesia (No 9), 2013 FCA 323 (Fed Ct Aust) at para 32.
80. Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya, 2020 SCC 5 at paras 97-98.
81. B010 v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58 at para 47.
82. Crown Zellerbach, supra note 56 at 432.
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under the Convention,” the broadcasting system “cannot be divided into
two parts [i.e., transmitter and receiver], each independent of the other.”83
6. Resort to treaties is seemingly permitted at all stages of POGG
analysis
I have identified examples from decided cases of where treaties have
proved relevant to the POGG analysis at its various stages. In doing so I
do not mean to suggest a closed list. So long as the foundational rule in Re
Labour Conventions is respected, there seems no grounds for prohibiting
judicial resort to treaties at any stage of the POGG analysis, whether under
its national concern branch or its emergency branch.
V. Treaties and POGG in the Greenhouse Gas references
As I noted at the outset, the three references arising from the federal
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act engage with the international
legal regime governing climate change. I now briefly review how the
Saskatchewan, Ontario and Alberta courts of appeal have used the relevant
international agreements in their POGG analyses.
1. Saskatchewan
The first court to rule on the constitutionality of the Act was the Court of
Appeal for Saskatchewan. Chief Justice Richards (Justices Jackson and
Schwann concurring) upheld the law under POGG. Justices Ottenbreit and
Caldwell found it invalid.
The POGG reasoning in both the majority and dissenting reasons
suffers from a basic confusion—attributable ultimately to the Attorney
General of Canada—about the Act’s pith and substance. For the Act
to be valid under POGG, it must have some identifiable matter that
can be said to fall within POGG, and particularly under its national
concern branch.84 Canada’s first position was that the Act’s matter was
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This was met with the objection that
“almost every kind of human action generates GHG emissions” and “a
general authority in relation to GHG emissions would allow Parliament’s
83. Re Radio, supra note 14 at 86.
84. In Saskatchewan, as in Ontario and Alberta, the Government of Canada declined to advance the
emergency branch of POGG, presumably because the Act is not temporary in its application. If the
Supreme Court of Canada finds the Act to be unconstitutional—a distinct possibility, in my view—the
federal government may wish to reintroduce it on a time-limited basis, even if that limit is many years
in duration. As I write, the country and much of the world are living through a long-lasting emergency
of a different nature: the COVID-19 pandemic. The notion that an emergency can last for years is
perhaps less surprising to parliamentarians and judges today than it was even a year ago. There is no
shortage of evidence that climate change is regarded internationally as an emergency. To take but one
example, the preamble to the Paris Agreement, supra note 7, describes climate change as “an urgent
and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet.”
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legislative reach to extend very substantially into traditionally provincial
affairs.”85 The answer to this objection, one might have thought, is that
the Act is obviously not addressed at safe levels of GHG emissions, but
only at dangerously excessive emissions causing global climate change.
While there is nothing new about GHGs per se, the phenomenon of GHG
emissions being so significant as to threaten life on Earth is obviously a
new one not contemplated by the Constitution Act, 1867.
This may be what Canada intended by its revised formulation of
the Act’s matter as “the cumulative dimensions of GHG emissions,” but
Chief Justice Richards rejected that rather uncertain characterization of
the Act, adopting instead (at the suggestion of British Columbia) the
following statement of the Act’s pith and substance for POGG purposes:
“the establishment of minimum national standards of price stringency for
GHG emissions.”86 Chief Justice Richards acknowledged that “framing
federal jurisdiction in this way could appear, at first blush, to involve a
rather tight or narrow formulation of the matter in question,” but defended
the formulation with reference to sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution
Act 1867 (parts of which define federal and provincial heads of power as
the establishment of various things) and decided POGG cases.87
The chief justice then considered whether “the idea of minimum
national standards of price stringency for GHG emissions” is a matter of
national concern. He observed that the “factual record before the Court
indicates that GHG pricing is not just part and parcel of an effective response
to climate change…[but] an essential aspect or element of the global
effort to limit GHG emissions.”88 He found support for that conclusion
in an affidavit of a federal assistant deputy minister with Environment
and Climate Change Canada, a World Bank report, and the affidavit of an
otherwise unidentified Dr. Rivers.89 Notably, the chief justice did not cite
any of the international agreements on this point. That is because those
agreements do not require states to adopt carbon pricing schemes. This fact
forces one to question Chief Justice Richards’ conclusion that GHG pricing
is essential to the international climate change project. If the international
community really did regard carbon pricing as essential to fighting climate
change, one might expect states to say so in treaty obligations. In saying
this I express no doubt about the efficacy of carbon pricing as a policy. My
point is simply that carbon pricing has not yet been adopted by states as a
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
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legal obligation, and therefore claims of international consensus must be
regarded with some skepticism.
The chief justice returned to Canada’s treaty commitments at the
“singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility” stage of his analysis. He
observed that GHG emissions do not respect provincial boundaries. Like
marine pollution in Crown Zellerbach, the failure of one province to take
action will impact other provinces. Every province is vulnerable to the
failure of another “to adequately price such emissions.”90 Furthermore,
climate change is a global problem calling for a global response, and
“[s]uch a response can only be effectively developed internationally
by way of state-to-state negotiation and agreement.”91 The chief justice
continued:
In participating in these international processes, Canada is expected to
make national commitments with respect to GHG reduction or mitigation
targets. Those commitments are self-evidently difficult for Canada,
as a country, to meet if not all provincial jurisdictions are prepared to
implement GHG emissions pricing regimes—regimes that, on the basis
of the record before the Court, are an essential aspect of successful GHG
mitigation plans. This is not to suggest Parliament must somehow enjoy
a comprehensive treaty implementation power in relation to the GHG
issue. But, it is to say that the international nature of the climate change
problem necessarily colours and informs an assessment of the effects of
a provincial failure to deal with GHG pricing.92

Some care must be taken here on the question of treaty implementation.
None of the treaties before the court require GHG pricing schemes; the
Act is not in implementation of any such obligation. Instead, GHG pricing
is a method Parliament has chosen to perform its more general obligation
under climate change agreements to reduce emissions. In that looser
sense, one can describe the Act as adopted in implementation of Canada’s
obligations. But despite the chief justice’s disclaimer of a comprehensive
treaty implementation power, his reasoning comes perilously close
to disregarding the rule in Re Labour Conventions. The political fact
underlying this litigation is that not all provinces care to adopt the federal
government’s preferred means of combatting climate change. If that fact is
invoked, together with the need to ensure performance of Canadian treaty
obligations, as grounds for according jurisdiction to Parliament under
POGG, the rule in Re Labour Conventions is broken, or at least very badly
bent.
90.
91.
92.
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Two interveners before the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal contended
that Parliament enjoyed legislative jurisdiction over the Act under a
freestanding treaty implementation power. Chief Justice Richards rejected
the submission as inconsistent with Re Labour Conventions. Notably, he
made no reference to Vapor Canada and Schneider. The reasons do not
indicate whether the interveners relied on those authorities. The chief
justice rightly concluded that “there is no federal treaty implementation
power.”93
Remarkably, the dissenting reasons ignore Canada’s treaty obligations
almost entirely. To the limited extent that they do engage with them, they
minimize their significance in POGG cases in a way that is difficult to
reconcile with the jurisprudence reviewed at length above.94
2. Ontario
The Court of Appeal for Ontario divided four to one in the result, with
Chief Justice Strathy upholding the Act under POGG with the concurrence
of Justices MacPherson and Sharpe. Associate Chief Justice Hoy wrote
separately, also upholding the Act but characterizing its subject matter
more narrowly. Justice Huscroft dissented, finding the Act ultra vires
Parliament.
The chief justice’s reasons began with the observation that there is “no
dispute that global climate change is taking place and that human activities
are the primary cause.”95 He reviewed the “uncontested evidence” before
the court of the harms climate change caused or exacerbated, noting recent
wildfires and floods in the provinces, the particular impact on Indigenous
communities, and the economic costs.96 He observed that provinces and
territories with very low emissions “often experience impacts of climate
change that are grossly disproportionate to their individual contributions to
Canada’s total GHG emissions,” and that there is nothing these provinces
and territories can do about it. “Without a collective national response, all
they can do is prepare for the worst.”97
Observing that the “international community has recognized that the
solution to climate change is not within the capacity of any one country,”
the chief justice reviewed the leading international climate change
agreements.98 Notably, he drew no great distinction between legally

93.
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See ibid at paras 427, 430.
Ontario Reference, supra note 3 at para 7.
Ibid at paras 11-15.
Ibid at paras 17-20.
Ibid at para 21.

926 The Dalhousie Law Journal

binding agreements (the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement) and those to
which Canada is no longer bound or never was (the Kyoto Protocol and the
Copenhagen Accord, respectively).99
Rejecting the characterizations of the Act proffered by both Canada
and Ontario, the chief justice observed that its purpose, “as reflected in
its Preamble and in Canada’s international commitments and domestic
initiatives…is to reduce GHG emissions on a nation-wide basis,” and that
its effect is to put a price on carbon pollution.100 The Act’s purpose and
effects revealed its pith and substance, in Chief Justice Strathy’s view,
as “establishing minimum national standards to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.”101
The chief justice went on to conclude that the Act is within
Parliament’s power under the national concern doctrine of POGG. On the
role of Canada’s international agreements in this analysis, he observed
that in considering whether the Act’s matter is both national and a concern
“in the constitutional sense,” the court may appropriately look, as a
contextual factor, to the fact that “the Act was enacted, as its Preamble
demonstrates, to give effect to Canada’s international obligations.”102 The
phrase “contextual factor” is elastic, sometimes to a fault. But deployed
here it is apt to capture the ambiguous position Canada’s treaty obligations
occupy in POGG cases, being at once binding legal obligations yet largely
evidentiary considerations for the purpose of the national concern analysis.
As for the chief justice’s description of the Act as giving effect to Canada’s
international obligations, I repeat that this must be read to refer to climate
change obligations generally, there being no specific commitment to enact
a carbon pricing scheme.
Succinctly summarizing Re Labour Conventions and Crown
Zellerbach, the chief justice observed, “[w]hile it has been held that
Parliament cannot implement treaties or international agreements that fall
outside its constitutional powers…the fact that a challenged law is related to
Canada’s international obligations is pertinent to its importance to Canada
as a whole,” and the “existence of a treaty or international agreement in
relation to the matter also speaks to its singularity and distinctiveness.”103

99.
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3. Alberta
The Court of Appeal of Alberta decided against Canada by a margin of four
to one. The majority opinion was co-written by Chief Justice Fraser and
Justices Watson and Hughes. Justice Wakeling gave concurring reasons,
and Justice Feehan dissented.
The majority characterized the Act’s matter as the regulation of
GHG emissions, and held that POGG can only transform matters falling
within the provinces’ residual legislative jurisdiction (section 92(16))
into matters of national concern.104 As the regulation of GHG emissions
came within provincial jurisdiction under other heads of power (including
natural resources, property and civil rights, local works and undertakings
and direct taxation), POGG had no application.105 In the alternative, the
majority held that the regulation of GHG emissions lacked the necessary
singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility to be recognized as a new
head of federal power.
The majority took note of international efforts to address climate
change, but the instruments themselves did not figure prominently in
their reasoning. They agreed with Chief Justice Richards that there is
no standalone treaty implementation power, again without reference to
Vapor Canada or Schneider.106 And they expressed (somewhat cryptically)
agreement with the observations of Justice Wakeling “on the differences
between treaties with compulsory targets, treaties with less compulsory
guidelines and international agreements of different sorts.”107
This latter comment appears to be directed at a discussion in Justice
Wakeling’s lengthy concurring reasons. That judge reviewed the relevant
international agreements extensively, including commentary on “divergent
opinions” as to whether certain articles of the UNFCCC and the Paris
Agreement contain legal obligations or only nonbinding aspirational
goals.108 It is an interesting issue, but unimportant for POGG purposes.
As we have seen, the relevance of international instruments in the national
concern analysis does not depend on their binding or non-binding character
in international law.
In dissent, Justice Feehan noted that Canada, British Columbia and
certain interveners submitted that “weight should be accorded to application
of the national concern doctrine as a result of Canada’s international
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agreements and commitments.”109 The learned judge referred briefly to
the use of such considerations in Crown Zellerbach and Ontario Hydro,
concluding that “Canada’s international agreements and commitments
favour, although do not determine, application of the national concern
doctrine for federal jurisdiction.”110 This dictum risks putting the matter
at too high a level of generality. The Privy Council and Supreme Court
of Canada precedents show those courts looking to relevant international
instruments in specific, purposeful ways. They are not simply factors to be
included in some ill-defined balancing exercise.
Conclusion
The constitutionality of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act will
be finally determined by the Supreme Court of Canada very soon. The
hearings, originally set for April but postponed due to the COVID-19
outbreak, were heard on 22 to 23 September 2020.
The Supreme Court has not heard a POGG case involving Canada’s
international obligations since 1993. Like every Supreme Court appeal,
these three references are an opportunity for the court to apply, tweak or
abandon its precedents. The role of Canada’s international obligations in
the determination of Parliament’s residual jurisdiction under the national
concern doctrine of POGG is theoretically somewhat complex, and its
application can be subtle. But the principles are intelligible, settled and
consistent with Canadian federalism. There is no need for judicial reform—
whether undertaken deliberately or by inadvertence. The approach to
treaties represented by Johannesson and Crown Zellerbach, informed by
Re Labour Conventions and rejecting Vapor Canada, has served us well.
It is not broken. I hope the court does not fix it.

109. Ibid at para 1037.
110. Ibid at paras 1037-1041.

